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I. The subject and its research antecedents 
 
On 7th June, 2009 the Movement for a Better Hungary 
(Hungarian: Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, shortly Jobbik) 
accounted for probably the greatest surprise in the political history 
of Hungary since the change of regime by gaining 14.77 per cent 
of votes and three seats in  the European Parliament. Observers 
were taken aback seeing the comet-like explosion, particularly 
after the under-estimation of pollsters, but the success of Jobbik is 
unique from several aspects. The party‟s popularity had risen from 
one per cent with extreme rapidness but getting into the National 
Assembly as a party out-of-the-Parliament was unparalleled as 
well (the only previous exception being the MIÉP, i.e. the 
Hungarian Justice and Life Party). The party system, which 
previously was believed to be closed and institutionalized (Enyedi 
2006) expressly discriminated the new competitors (high explicit 
and implicit threshold on elections, way less access to state funds 
and media). In spite of all these, Jobbik not only got into the 
National Assembly in 2010 with 16.7 per cents, but developed 
into one of the most powerful radical-far right parties of Europe as 
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well. As for me, the greatest curiosity – and the most exciting 
scientific development –, however is the breaking-up of the 
bipolar party system by the Jobbik, meaning that the party steadily 
supported by 15 per cents of voters (September 2013) ended the 
party system existing since 1998 and had become the strongest 
rival of both Fidesz and MSZP since then.  
 
How could Jobbik manage to do all these? What happened in 
2009 that pushed the party so high within just a half year? Why 
was the Jobbik able to increase its support until and to stabilize it 
after 2010? What resources did the far right relied on while 
reaching so far? How could it drive the media‟s attention to itself? 
Did the other parties‟ reactions contributed to the Jobbik‟s boom? 
What deeper social processes set the groundfor the strengthening 
of the far right? Why radical right parties are considered 
significant factors nowadays all over Europe? How the rise of 
Jobbik fits into the broader frame of European happenings, what 
similarities and Hungarian specialties can we notice? Finally, 
what effects does the breakthrough of Jobbik has on the other 
parties and the party system itself? My dissertation aims to answer 
these questions in order to help us to understand the „Jobbik-
phenomenon‟.To put it briefly, I seek for the cause of the 
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popularity of Jobbik.   
 
At the beginning of the paper I examine the question of defining  
radical right, far-right and neo-Nazi parties (Norris 2005, Mudde 
2007, 2011, Capoccia 2002, Filippov 2011), then I find the place 
of Jobbik in this network of concepts. In the next part I use several 
independent approaches in the given chapters to present the causes 
of the far-right party‟s success. The second chapter is dedicated to 
the social and economic macro processes that can trigger the 
susceptibility of citizens to radicalism: economic crisis, the break-
up of traditional social classes (Lubbers et al 2002, Arzeimer 
2009, Bornschier 2010), immigration (Kitschelt and McGann 
1995, Ivarsfalten 2008) and disillusionment from the elite 
(Fenemma 1997, Bélanger and Arts 2006). In the third part I 
examine decisions made by other parties and their impact on 
Jobbik‟s electoral success. What positions did far-right and bigger 
parties take concerning major issues, what distances did evolve 
between them (De Lange 2007, Van der Brug - Von Spanje 2007); 
how did the civic society and other parties react on the appearance 
of the far-right (Art 2007, 2011); what already existing bases and 
subcultures could the radical party rely on (Art 2008, Minkenberg 
2013), what path did it take,what was the party‟s leadership and 
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organization like; and finally, what institutional features did help 
or hinder its strengthening (the proportionality of electoral system, 
access to media and state funds, etc.). In the fourth chapter I take a 
look on media appearances of radical parties and study that in 
which cases and to what extent can the appearances of issues 
owned by them increase their support (Ellinas 2009). Then I use 
these regularities in the case of Jobbik‟s breakthrough in 2009; 
finally I present the online world of the party in details. Then 
comes the most unique chapter since the Jobbik‟s outstanding 
popularity amongst the youth is – only with one exception - 
unparalleled in Europe. In this fifth chapter I will interpret the 
generational patterns of the party‟s support building on the 
particularities of the far-right subculture and use the previous 
approaches as well.  
 
In the sixth chapter I examine what happened to Jobbik after 
2010: what determines its popularity as a parliamentary party, 
what effects did the institutional system and other parties have on 
it and contrary: what effects did Jobbik have on Hungarian 
parties?Here I use the international literature again (Schain 2006, 
Van Spanje 2010, Alonso-Claro da Fonseca 2012, Mudde 2013)to 
explain the interactions between Jobbik and other actors, thenI 
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take one potential field after the other in which the mechanisms of 
action are interpretable; finally I show the displacements of recent 
years in these dimensions. The Jobbik could „stuck‟ in the 
political elite: it is proven by that it could influence the political 
agenda, the public opinion, the government‟s public policy and 
the other parties‟ stances to a way greater extent than its actual 
support would suggest. This chapter is also necessary to present 
the chain of causation since the causal relationship is an 
interactive one(e. g. the appearance of „gypsy question‟ on the 
agenda is both a cause and an effect of the expansion of political 
radicalism). 
II. Methods used 
 
In my thesis I manly used the approach of political sociology, and 
it applies to the hypotheses and the methodology as well. First of 
all, when it comes to confirm or deny my findings, I use public 
opinion polls‟ data to demonstrate it. I analyze in details the data 
of Hungarian Election Research Program from 2009 and 2010, the 
aggregated omnibuses of Median from 2012, the database of 
Tárki‟s prejudice-research from 2011, the database of the fifth 
wave (2010) of the European Social Survey and the youth 
research of the Active Youth in Hungary Research Group from 
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2011-2012, in which I personally participated. Besides these, I 
also use other sources of data as bases for comparison (for 
instance the Facebook survey of Political Capital and Demos), in 
the forms of direct analysis or citation of studies built on them. 
Media analysis is the second in the order of importance thus I 
present the political agenda of 2009 and 2010 by detailed analysis 
of the main media channels. The online network of the far-right is 
also included in the content analysis, just like the quantified data 
of the covers of Barikád and Jobbik‟s activity in the Parliament 
(Gábor Vona‟s pre-agenda speeches and amendments, etc.) and 
outside of it (protests) as well. Systematic data collection helped 
to describe the party‟s organization and other supply factors, 
while when it came to examine the far-right subculture I used in-
depth interviews and focus groups. I concentrated on the young: I 
had interviews with six leaders of the youth organization of the 
Jobbik, two former members of the allied Sixty-Four Counties 
Youth Movement (Hungarian abbreviation: HVIM) and two 
central party leaders as well. Besides that I myself have done the 
majority of the standardized interviews of the Active Youth in 
Hungary Research Group; similarly I myself made the interviews 
with Jobbik MPs in 2010 as part of the elite research. Moreover, 
during the surveys of Active Youth (and on other occasions as 
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well) in the countryside I spoke with young Jobbik supporters 
several times informally. Besides the impressions from the media 
and the scientific literature, the foremost mentioned knowledge 
base is what my paper is built on. 
 
Hungarian scientific literature does not lack research on Jobbik. I 
dedicated a separate subsection to summarize the results of 
previous empirical works. The media-centered analysis 
(Karácsony-Róna 2010, Jeskó-Bakó-Tóth 2012) that has stressed 
importance in my view and the popularity research amongst the 
youth (Sőrés-Róna 2012) is not common yet. In the other hand we 
had several explanations based on demand approaches: Péter 
Krekó and his colleagues focused on attitudes and value 
preferences (Krekó-Juhász-Molnár 2011, Bernát-Juhász-Krekó-
Molnár 2012), while others tied the rise of Jobbik to the economic 
crisis and social-financial status (Tóth-Grajczár 2011, Rudas 
2010). The research of Dániel Mikecz (Mikecz 2013) is built on 
the supply side, using the subcultural explanation, while I myself 
examined the Jobbik‟s history and coursewith András Bíró-Nagy 
(Bíró Nagy – Róna 2011). So far it was András Kovács (2013) 
who studied the voters of Jobbik on the broadest empirical base.  
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III. Results of the dissertation
1
 
 
The main aim of the dissertation is to find explanations to the rise 
of Jobbik and to point out those causes which led to the party‟s 
success. To do this, we have to find the party‟s place and name in 
the family of radical and far-right parties in Europe. My 
comprehension puts the parties on ethnocentric bases into one 
family of parties, since other features (euroscepticism, anti-
immigration and anti-elite feelings) can be derived from this. 
However, it is an important dividing line whether these parties are 
antisystemic ones or not, which includes two questions: are their 
views compatible with democracy and whether they are interested 
in sustaining or overthrowing the system?The latter one usually 
cannot be answered until they form a government, the previous 
one, however, provides ground for me to classify Jobbik as 
antisystemic and far-right party.The views and historical role 
models of the party and its chairman are not compatible with 
democracy and by sustaining the successor organizations of the 
Hungarian Guard the Jobbik consciously confronts the current 
system.Anti-gypsy and anti-Semitic statements often appear with 
                                                          
1
In this abstract, naturally, only some highlihted moments of analyses and 
concise versions of statements can be found. For complete understanding, 
however, it is indispensable to read the whole text of the dissertation. 
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great emphasis amongst the party‟s pronouncements, they 
seemingly relate to these two ethnicities in a different way than 
the others. Their generalizing negative prejudice is more than 
what Western radical parties represent on the issue of 
immigration. However, it is an even bigger dividing line that 
distinguishes the members of radical-far-right party family 
(including Jobbik) from neo-Nazis. Neo-Nazi parties are ethno-
centrists as well, but in addition they are racist and violent too: 
this means more than prejudice and it includes ethnic-based 
discrimination as well – this latter one, however, is not a feature 
of far-right ones. 
 
After the chapter dealing with the appellation and typologies I 
presented causal mechanisms in four theoretical frameworks 
explaining the rise of Jobbik. Without any detailed research it was 
known that both demand, supply and media approaches contain 
some of the truth, while the explanation based on generations was 
inevitable as well. With this dissertation my aim was that the 
given groups of theories become more crystallized and based on 
broader empirical bases than previously.I also want to present the 
hierarchy of different approaches based on the explanatory power 
to show to what extent did the given ones contributed to the rise of 
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Jobbik and how these processes are linked to each other. The 
findings are the followings:  
 
1. After studying the presented survey data it seems obvious that 
all aspects of ethnocentrism characterize the supporters of 
Jobbik. A great bulk of Jobbik supporters highlight “national 
commitment” as his primary motivation and the party‟s 
program and statements reflect this thought as well: „Hungary 
belongs to Hungarians.‟ This motto is the foundation stone of 
all European radical-far-right parties‟ identity and leads to 
several other factors, like xenophobia. However, I tried to go 
beyond the hackneyed allegation „anti-gypsy sentiment led to 
the strengthening of Jobbik‟.      
 
First of all, the prejudice of Jobbik voters is not only selective 
because it targets mainly Jews and Gypsies, but in their heads 
they have several situative considerations attached to these 
two ethnicities. They connect Jews with negative ideological 
notions and conspiracy theories, althoughit depends on the 
circumstances whether these notions and theories surface or 
not – moreover, in some situations they can even be positive 
ones (for instance, rich and clever Jews).The anti-gypsy 
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sentiment is more dominant and explicit since in case of 
gypsies the general negative predisposition and the negative 
personal experience reinforce each other. However, one of the 
most important lessons learned from the data is that the far-
right does not differ the most from other voters in the extent of 
anti-gyspy sentiment, but the importance: Jobbik voters regard 
this problem way more important that any supporters of any 
other parties. Likewise, supporters of Jobbik do not have bad 
experiences with gypsies at a significantly greater rate. The 
real difference is that these experiences affected more their 
lives and surroundings thus having had a greater effect on 
their thinking as well.  
2. According to the lessons of multivariate analyses, anti-elite 
feelings (as a demand factor) have maybe more modest, but 
still very important role. Jobbik follows the European 
tendencies, just like to its „sister parties‟ it gains a lot from the 
people‟s disillusionment from the reigning elites. According to 
the youth survey this not only means anti-elite but anti-system 
feelings too,since young voters of Jobbik are dissatisfied with 
not only the working of democracy, but the system itself as 
well.  
3. I attribute weaker explanatory power to the most popular and 
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most studied theory in literature that trace the expansion of 
radicalism back to the crisis of economy and 
modernization.Recent studies I present deny the linear 
connection between income, property, working conditions and 
far-right preference all over Europe; what is more, the 
financial status of Jobbik supporters is especially good in 
European comparison. In multivariate analyses the variables 
showing financial deprivation were rarely significant and 
usually the weakest ones; likewise, very few respondents 
mentioned such motives for voting to Jobbik in open survey 
questions. Moreover, in this context the outstanding support of 
Jobbik amongst the youth is uninterpretable as well. Western 
literature does not even measure this hypothesis this way: in 
recent days it is assumed that some kind of feeling of loss or 
endangerment contributes to radicalization, but this is only 
partly financial. Based on theories of Fromm, besides the 
frustration caused by crime, it is loss of identity, the lack of 
social self-respect and insecurity that describes the mechanism 
more precisely. If the social dividing line is not based on 
status but instead ethnicities it can restore the self-assurance 
and self-image of some of the down-and-out radicals and they 
can find scapegoats as well. This cannot be tested with the 
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thoroughness needed on the data I use, however I assume this 
hypothesis would be more likely confirmed than the original 
one. In the youth research the young Jobbik-voter respondents 
were unsure and pessimist about their future while their 
financial status wasn‟t significantly worse than that of the 
others.   
4. It becomes even harder to compare if we look from the supply 
approach. It is obvious that demand and supply approaches are 
complementaries of each other. There can be social need for 
any policies, if there is no political party to benefit from it; 
similarly, not even the most brilliant leadership of a party can 
achieve success if there is simply no demand for what they 
represent.  
 
Within the supply part it was the political constellation which 
had a very strong role in the strengthening of Jobbik.Although 
the endowments of the system were unfavorable for the party 
(high electoral threshold, lack of access to mainstream media 
and state funds) the dissatisfaction with the political elite was 
bigger than ever in 2009.A relevant far-right party had existed 
in Hungary previously, but it was in its ruins by 2006 – this 
and the extremely virulent subculture provided the intellectual 
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ammunition and the bulk of the human resources without 
dividing voters between two contemporary rivals. Compared 
to this the party‟s organizational structure and leadership had 
only secondary importance – it was the mass of enthusiastic 
activists what the party itself really contributed with to the 
success. Without thousands of active members (as of 2009) 
Jobbik could have never reached so many people and convince 
them personally. Finally, the charismatic Gábor Vona, 
Krisztina Morvai (who was then far more known than the 
chairman) and the Hungarian Guard were the most efficient 
weapons of the party: with them it could draw media‟s and the 
voters‟ attention, and – to a smaller extent – it was even 
helped by its political rivals‟ counterproductive anti-
campaigns. From this we can see that the supply-side is linked 
not only to demand but the media as well. Evaluation of its 
independent explanatory power can only be even more 
arbitrary than previously since we lack numbers, but I think it 
was medium-strong. The most inevitable helping factors in the 
success of Jobbik were the Hungarian Guard, the established 
organizational power and the favorable political constellation.  
5. The significance of media is valorized primary by the time 
dimension: if a party rise so high during such a short period of 
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time, that it definitely needed active media presence. (Ellinas 
2010). Neither the antipathy against the Roma, present since 
decades, nor the anti-gypsy rhetoric of Jobbik or the 
Hungarian Guard could result in progress for the party if the 
issue had not become part of the agenda pushing the Jobbik to 
the media in the beginning of 2009. In the chapter dedicated to 
this I presented in details how strong the connection was 
between the presence in media and the public‟s perception of 
the agenda. Perception of agenda is the nearest step to party 
preference. Framing has significant effect on it as well, but 
data show that not even negative framing could cause harm to 
Jobbik since the party could transmit its messages and 
arguments to its voters via its alternative channels of media. 
Thus appearing on the main media channels and on the 
websites of the counterculture (mainly on the kuruc.info) 
gavea huge push for Jobbik. Again, this cannot be quantified, 
but I assume that this was the strongest factor in the victory of 
2009. As the European Parliamentary election of this year and 
its results had a great determining effect on the party‟s later 
results I regard the media approach as a strong explanation.  
6. The study of Jobbik‟s extreme popularity among the young is 
linked to demand-supply theories, however, I regarded it as an 
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independent explanation. In the database representing 
university and college students it was more common to have 
anti-gypsy or anti-elite feelings and to reject democracy as 
political system among the supporters of Jobbik; however, the 
strongest odds ratio was linked to (respondents with) 
subcultural affiliation.  
 
No surprise that reading kuruc.info, listening to national rock 
or attending the Hungarian Island Festival (Hungarian: 
Magyar Sziget) lead to ballots casted to Jobbik, but the 
conclusion of qualitative interviews offers a new frame of 
interpretation. According to this, several young voters do not 
join Jobbik for ideological reasons; moreover, this could be 
even hard for them since theirvalue preferences are usually 
immature and inconsistent, with the simultaneous presence of 
liberal, radical, order-minded, authoritarian and prejudiced 
values. They only join because they need a community that 
offers them identity and the interpretation of the world – and 
in their surroundings, it is uniquely the Jobbik. The radical 
party is not only popular among the young, but according to 
the data of Medián, its popularity reaches the highest peaks in 
the cohort of those who are under 22 years old. According to 
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my analysis, the main reason for it is that youngest ones have 
the most free energy: they live in relationships, work or 
members of civic organizations at a way smaller rate than their 
older peers. This is, of course, true to all young people, but – 
according to the data – characterizes Jobbik-supporters to a 
greater extent than those who are of the same age but vote for 
other parties. Demand meets supply: for those who want to do 
something there are not much alternatives (mainly in Eastern-
Hungary) besides the hardly even existing political left and the 
„old hat‟ Fidesz.Jobbik puts a lot efforts inaddressing them: it 
organizes a variety of camps, professional events, protest and 
cultural programs greatly backed by „national rock‟ bands and 
other elements of the far-right subculture (for instance 
organizations of material arts and folk traditionalists). This 
approach explains the most why Jobbik is likeable for lots of 
young people, making the low mean age the most 
characteristic feature of the far-right party‟s audience.I would 
evaluate then this explanation as a strong one.  
 
Nevertheless, there is an other aspect of evaluation: the place 
of the explanation in the chain of causation. It is possible that 
behind an explanation, found to be very strong, lies another, 
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less strong phenomenon. Until now I used strength in 
statistical sense, but we have toexamine this other aspect as 
well besides the magnitude of correlation. Speaking the 
language of the diagram: until now I tried to express the 
strength of the arrows, but now, as we untangled casual 
relationships we have to place these arrows, too.  
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Figure 1. Reasons behind the strengthening of Jobbik 
  
sympathy 
for Jobbik 
 innovative and efficien party leadership: 
Hungarian Guard, the ‟invention‟ of 
Krisztina Morvai  
murders linked 
to gypsies  
media puts the issue on 
its ageda  
the question appears in the front 
line of people‟s thinking  
Jobbik becomes well-
known 
need for an anti-
establishment 
party, favorable 
constellation  
dramatic decrease 
of trust in the 
political elite  
alternative 
publicity, 
internet 
anti-gypsy 
predisposition  
adressing the young and the 
men 
strong structural background of 
Jobbik, pre-existing virulent far-
right subculture  
fails of youth policies, lack of 
communities and indentity 
amongst the teenagers  
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First of all, I‟d like to emphasize that the figure is infinite if it 
aims to represent the reality. Every cause is an effect as well: a 
separate dissertation could be dedicated to the features lying 
behind the decline of trust in the political elite. The happenings of 
the autumn of 2006 could be highlighted as well – these events 
have a determining place in Jobbik‟s identity as well as in the 
speeches of Gábor Vona even until now.Secondly, note that a 
great part of the causes is not direct, but indirect. Becoming well-
known and the expansion on the internet in itself would have not 
resulted in sympathy for the far-right party. What else was needed 
is that Jobbik took stances in topics that interested people and had 
influence on their everyday lives; moreover, it used such way of 
speaking that a significant part of the society needed.  
 
It can be clearly seen from the figure that the deepest causes (the 
ones from which the arrows start) are the anti-gypsy feelings and 
the murders committed by or against gypsies drawing attention to 
it;the decrease of trust in the political elite and the supply features: 
the four valuable resources of the party: the Hungarian Guard, 
Kriszina Morvai, the far-right subculture and the internet. With 
their help could the Jobbik reach the people – personally or 
through the media.  
25 
 
To put it briefly and simply: several factors contributed to the rise 
of Jobbik; even the ones with weaker explanatory power were 
necessary, but I see two key moments: the media agenda of 2009 
that transformed the anti-gypsy feeling into political will and the 
subculture enabling the involvement of the young. 
 
It worth to distinguish the situation after 2009 when the party 
relied on less the gypsy question. We know from Ellinas (2010) 
that a party primary needs strong structural background and social 
embeddednessaccompanied with diverse ideological ammunition 
to preserve its support after sudden boom.Features determining 
party choice on the long run are currently given in the case of 
Jobbik: the party‟s organization was strong enough in its „boom 
period‟ as well and it has only improved since the success of 
2009. The diversity of ideological ammunition is necessary, 
because the Jobbik‟s popularity cannot solely depend on the 
presence of the questions of gypsies and public safety on the 
agenda. I have presented previously that Jobbik could well adapt 
to the current political agenda by representing topics like anti-
communism, anti-globalization, anti-Western and anti-elite 
feelings („political criminality‟), FX loans, land question 
zestfully.The ideology offered by Jobbik is a complex 
26 
 
interpretation of the world, giving palpable answers and 
scapegoats for all the problems of its audience.  
The party‟s effect on governmental policies can have both positive 
and negative consequences on its future popularity as well. 
Naturally, it is a real danger that Fidesz will pinpoint the topics of 
Jobbik (euroscepticism, war of independence,legislature favoring 
order-minded voters) to attract a great share of radical voters. In 
the other hand, it is also possible that with this Fidesz only makes 
the ideas of Jobbik more popular with leaving the radical audience 
basically untouched. This also makes Jobbik a more legitimate 
actor who can claim that it‟s worth voting for it: even if it cannot 
form a government yet, it still has a significant influence on the 
central decision-making.  
*** 
The success of Jobbik has a broader reading as well, and this is 
what my paper‟s title refer to. The Jobbik phenomenon does not 
only mean the exact results of the party – it also includes the 
question how a new force can achieve such breakthrough in a 
highly institutionalized political system. How could the far-right 
grow over 15 percent in a country, where it did not even nearly 
had such support since the change of regime? Finally, what does it 
take to have a critical election like the one in 2010 and to have 
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such radical change in the party system? These questions go 
beyond the frames of my dissertation, but it might worth to think 
about them. In my opinion, the interpretation of a middle-sized 
party on subcultural basis is something of a new approach 
compared to the international literature. Naturally, the usual 
demand and supply models explain a lot concerning the rise of 
Jobbik, just like media theories; even behind the popularity 
amongst the young there are reasons linked to demand, supply and 
media. Nonetheless, there are some specialties in the Hungarian 
(and the seemingly analogical Austrian) case. The socialization 
and the stage of life of teens and twenties (again, classic concepts 
of Inglehart) simply predestine the young in Hungary to choose a 
party that radically differs from the previous ones. With minimal 
ideological identity – or even consciousness –, just with habitual 
and stylistic elements, by offering an alternative community and 
identity, young people in completely different situations could be 
addressed as well.This approach helps us to understand the 
expansion of not only the Jobbik, but the LMP as well. Way of 
speaking fitted to the young, forms of appearance, programs, 
freshness, almost exclusive presence in certain regions – 
altogether they are enough to gain the sympathy of a teenager who 
has unsettled views and who could have found him or herself in a 
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completely other political family if it weren‟t they who had 
spoken to him or her first.    
 
However, it was somehow regular that the Fidesz and the MSZP 
can find its way only to a smaller and smaller part of the young. 
This is a European phenomenon as well: new voters are more 
critical with traditional parties while being more open to new and 
alternative movements. Another general rule is that an inveterate 
party system – that is artificially narrowed down against the will 
of voters with state regulations – can easily explode after its 
decades of (apparent) rest.Voters were longing for a new party for 
long enough, the trust index of all politicians and institutions were 
constantly decreasing even before 2006. The happenings of fall 
2006 only accelerated this process. The only reasons because a 
new force had not emerged preciously were the electoral system 
discriminating small parties and the limited access to media and 
state funds. This time, however, discontent reached such levels 
that not only Jobbik, but the LMP (organized way worse, 
embedded way less than the radical party) could benefit from as 
well. This again, shows us that other „revolutionary‟ party could 
have reached similar success; the breakthrough of Jobbik was not 
the result of the rightist shift of the society‟s political 
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preferences.The party can thank its success to the fortunate 
constellation of the previously mentionedfactors. The Jobbik-
phenomenon maybe shows us that political constellation always 
provides plenty of opportunities to both new and old actors, but it 
is very rare that a political formation can benefit from them at 
such a good rate, in such favorable conditions with such 
efficiency.  
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